The Purpose of Interbank Markets by Krause, Jens
 
 
 
Saïd Business School 
Research Papers 
Saïd Business School RP 2016-17 
 
The Saïd Business School’s working paper series aims to provide early access to high-quality and rigorous academic research. Oxford Saïd’s 
working papers reflect a commitment to excellence, and an interdisciplinary scope that is appropriate to a business school embedded in one of the 
world’s major research universities..   
 
This paper is authorised or co-authored by Oxford Saïd faculty. It is circulated for comment and discussion only. Contents should be considered 
preliminary, and are not to be quoted or reproduced without the author’s permission. 
 
The Purpose of Interbank Markets 
Jens Krause 
Saïd Business School, University of Oxford 
 
 
May 2016 
The Purpose of Interbank Markets
Jens Krause∗
CABDyN Complexity Centre, Sa¨ıd Business School, University of Oxford
Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School,
University of Oxford
9 May 2016
Abstract
This paper tests competing theories of interbank lending using 43 quarters (2002-
2012) of confidential data on the German banking sector and interbank market. It
shows that banks use the interbank market for liquidity co-insurance as traditionally
assumed. However, the importance of the liquidity management function is higher
for regionally-focused credit cooperatives and savings banks than for private com-
mercial banks. A distinct effect for private banks is identified; for private banks,
increases in interbank liabilities are shown to correlate with a proxy for the bailout
probability of banks. The paper thus offers empirical support for an emerging liter-
ature on strategic behaviour in interbank markets and highlights the need to extend
the traditional model of liquidity co-insurance.
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Models of interbank markets usually assume that banks use interbank lending to balance
out temporal or regional liquidity shocks. Reciprocal interbank loans or deposits are
considered to be liquidity co-insurance (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Bhattacharya and
Gale, 1987; Castiglionesi and Wagner, 2013). This traditional view is complemented by
models that consider additional incentives for banks to be active in the interbank market.
The German banking sector contains different types of universal banks that differ in their
governance structure. Besides private commercial banks, it contains savings banks and
cooperative banks, which are comparable in their activities but the former is publicly
owned while the latter is private. This structure offers a controlled setting in which
the purpose of interbank markets can be studied. We use confidential data from the
Deutsche Bundesbank to examine those theories empirically. While the data supports
the theory of liquidity co-insurance, especially for regionally-focused savings banks and
credit cooperatives, further incentives play a role for private banks. In order to identify
potential strategic behaviour, we examine whether changes in interbank liabilities affect
the bailout probability of banks. In the absence of extensive evidence on what determines
bank bailouts, the study uses a proxy for the bailout probability, which is a balance sheet-
based indicator for the systemic importance of banks derived from work of Glasserman
and Young (2015). We find that increasing interbank liabilities correlate with increases in
this indicator for the bailout probability. This finding suggests that theories of interbank
lending, while not replacing liquidity co-insurance as an assumption, need to consider
strategic behaviour as additional drivers of the interbank market.
It is not only since the 2007-2009 financial turmoil that interbank exposures have
been studied with increased interest. While interbank lending can provide banks with
liquidity at times of need and allows them to employ excess funds profitably, it also
generates a form of systemic risk in the banking system. When one institution cannot
fulfil its obligation to its creditors, the creditors themselves may experience financial
distress. Rochet and Tirole (1996) argue for the possibility of contagious failures in the
context of showing how interbank deposits can prevent bank defaults. Allen and Gale
(2000) famously describe this phenomenon of financial contagion and have motivated a
large literature on the link between systemic risk and structural features of the financial
system. This extant field of literature has developed from the work of Eisenberg and Noe
(2001). It spans theoretical work (Gai and Kapadia, 2010; Gai, Haldane and Kapadia,
2011; Haldane and May, 2011) as well as empirical analyses of systemic risk of financial
systems (Angelini, Nobili and Picillo, 2011; Boss et al., 2004; Cont, Moussa and Santos,
2013; Craig and von Peter, 2014; Degryse and Nguyen, 2007; Iyer and Peydro, 2011;
Mistrulli, 2011; Upper and Worms, 2004).1 Increasing interbank exposures have been
identified as one of the major drivers of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 (Brunnermeier,
2009). However, despite the significance of interbank liability exposures for systemic
risk in financial markets, few explanations or systematic descriptions of the strategic
behaviour driving these exposures exist (cf. Eisert and Eufinger, 2013 for an exception).
How to manage systemic risk in the light of increased co-exposures and higher in-
1Ladley (2013) provides a concise overview of some of the main works, also cf. Bartram, Brown and
Hund (2007).
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terconnectedness of banks is a question of importance to both economists and policy
makers. This paper aims to contribute to identifying the factors that influence interbank
exposures. Before presenting the results of a hypothesis test examining the implications
of competing theories of interbank lending, we describe the German interbank market
and present an identification strategy to isolate drivers of interbank market activities.
To motivate the hypotheses, we present both the traditional view of interbank lending
as well as complementary theories. Some models such as the one proposed in Krause
and Reed-Tsochas (2016) ignore idiosyncratic liquidity shocks as a reason for interbank
lending and show that an interbank market can emerge if interbank exposures affect
bailout probabilities of banks. The ensuing hypothesis test uses constructs derived from
the balance sheet data of German banks and some aggregated exposure information.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first review relevant academic work that touches
on drivers of the interbank market and on literature pertinent to strategic behaviour of
banks in interbank markets. We then provide an overview of the structure of the German
interbank market and the German financial sector as a whole in order to motivate the
identification strategy. In a section on methodology, we present the main variables and
the hypothesis test before discussing regression results. A similar regression analysis,
testing the liquidity hypothesis and further hypotheses on the determinants of interbank
markets, has been carried out in a Bundesbank-SAFE research project ’On the empirical
Determinants of Interbank Markets’ (Bluhm, Georg and Krahnen, 2016). Lastly, we
discuss the implications of our findings both for theoretical work as well as for policy
makers.
1 Competing theories of interbank exposures
Much of the literature on the behaviour of banks in interbank markets assumes that
banks operate in the market in order to satisfy liquidity needs. This assumption is
rarely questioned and often not even made explicit.
In order to study the purpose of interbank markets it is necessary to understand the
mechanisms and drivers that lead to its existence. To date no conclusive examination
of these incentives exists. However, a large literature has studied the consequences of
interbank connections for the financial system, or how the complexity of interbank mar-
kets and the interconnectedness of banks create systemic risk. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to review that literature extensively. Some references to the main works are
important to motivate this study though. Gai and Kapadia (2010) examine how differ-
ent interbank network structures affect the potential threat of contagious defaults. Gai,
Haldane and Kapadia (2011), Haldane and May (2011), and Battiston et al. (2012b),
amongst many others, further this line of thinking by introducing the effect of com-
plex network structures and studying the risks inherent to varying degrees and types
of connectedness. Other more recent work in this area includes Cabrales, Gottardi and
Vega-Redondo (2014), Elliott, Golub and Jackson (2014), Ladley (2013), and Upper
(2011). Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015), Battiston et al. (2012a), and
Glasserman and Young (2015) study how and whether the actual structure of networks
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affects the risk of contagion. Most of the works in these areas assume the structure of
interbank networks as being determined ex-ante. They differ in their results on the effect
of the structure of interbank networks on default propagation. Some authors argue that
the underlying structure can be found to significantly affect the robustness of financial
networks, while others argue that, regardless of the underlying structure, the magnitude
of a shock determines whether contagious defaults will occur. Some works that consider
emergent interbank networks are discussed in the next subsection. Even when interbank
loans are studied as the outcome of some endogenous process, it is usually done under the
assumption that banks face liquidity shocks and co-insure each others against uncertain
future liquidity needs.
Some models have studied other incentives for entering interbank exposures. They
are discussed together with the model in Krause and Reed-Tsochas (2016) in order to
motivate the hypothesis that interbank markets serve as a mechanism to manage the
bailout probability of a bank (either through the private sector or a government) in the
case of financial distress.
1.1 Liquidity needs hypothesis
Banks act as financial intermediaries who issue long-term loans using short-term fluctu-
ating demand deposits transforming illiquid assets into liquid liabilities. In this context
interbank lending is modelled as a deterministic process based on probabilistic fund al-
location. In their canonical work in this area, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that
given deposit insurance, banks improve welfare by balancing regionally and temporally
dispersed liquidity needs. This is a functional view of banking rather than a theory of
bank behaviour. In their three-period model (T = 0, 1, 2) Diamond and Dybvig assume
that banks are mutually owned and resolved in the last time period. Assuming that
liquidity needs are randomly distributed and liquidity shocks independent, large enough
banks would be able to balance out fluctuations in liquidity demand. If a bank cannot
fulfil its obligations to depositors, a lender of last resort can provide needed short-term
liquidity in order to prevent bank runs (Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987). How a lender
of last resort should operate is of great theoretical importance as well as practical rele-
vance, but is not the focus of this paper. Freixas, Martin and Skeie (2011, 2658) provide
a concise summary of this theory: “[the] main purpose of [the interbank market] is to
redistribute the fixed amount of reserves that is held within the banking system”.2
Models in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) consider banks to invest
aggregate deposits in order to generate a return that is then shared among depositors.
In the original three-period model, banks can choose to allocate funds to short-term
and long-term investment technologies at T = 1, when they learn the distribution of
types in the population of agents.3 Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Bhattacharya
and Fulghieri (1994) present a model in which banks need to commit to their investment
2Also cf. Ladley (2013). In their model bilateral interest rates determine the lending and borrowing
appetite of banks, who can only be either borrower or lender.
3It is assumed that there are two types of agents in the population. Patient agents, who only value
consumption at T = 2 and impatient agents, who only value consumption at T = 1.
4
in long-term and short-term technologies before they learn the types of their depositors.
Thus, in their model banks face liquidity shocks at T = 1 because they either invested
too much in the short-term technology (which leaves an individual bank with excess
liquidity) or too little (which would leave some depositors empty-handed). Bearing in
mind the assumption of a countably infinite number of banks and a publicly known
distribution of patient and impatient depositors, banks can improve their utility by
lending and borrowing from and to each other. Rather than default on depositors in the
case of a liquidity shortfall, banks can draw on interbank deposits at T = 1 to satisfy
liquidity needs. This insurance assumes of course that most banks hold deposits with
each other, so that a bank with a shortfall has access to a bank with excess liquidity.
It is this view of shared interbank deposits or lending that became the dominant
theory of interbank markets. Freixas and Holthausen (2005) extend this model to cross-
country lending and in that context consider asymmetric information between countries.
Freixas and Rochet (2008) provide a textbook overview of the liquidity provision role of
the interbank market. Some models study the formation of lending or deposit contracts
and thus the formation of interbank markets. These works largely follow the tradition of
banks interacting to balance liquidity shocks such as in Castiglionesi and Navarro (2011)
or Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015).
Taken together, these works explain the function of the interbank market by its
ability to resolve liquidity shocks and to provide liquidity co-insurance to banks. This
type of liquidity co-insurance has been studied extensively, also with regards to a tradeoff
between the access to liquidity and exposure to contagious shocks (cf. Brusco and
Castiglionesi, 2007; Castiglionesi and Wagner, 2013 or Ladley (2013) amongst others).4
The following hypothesis summarises the traditional view of interbank markets and
allows one to test it empirically:
H1 Banks manage liquidity needs through the interbank market: an increase in li-
abilities to other banks is positively and strongly correlated with an increase in
liquidity needs of a bank.
1.2 Strategic positioning hypothesis
Some models have been proposed that consider strategic behaviour in the interbank
market, either complementing liquidity co-insurance or replacing it. Babus (2014) offers
a model in which banks engage in interbank lending in order to minimise the risk of
contagion in the case of defaults. While banks form links in order to insure themselves
against liquidity shocks, they aim to maximise their degree (number of counter parties)
and minimise individual exposure. The Babus model in particular raises the question
of why banks should act in a manner that optimises global features of the market. As
4Banks engage in interbank lending to deal with liquidity shocks, but (leveraged) banks hoard liquidity
when they face a potential future demand for liquidity (precautionary demand motive; Acharya and
Skeie, 2011; Ashcraft, McAndrews and Skeie, 2011; Diamond and Rajan, 2011; Gai and Kapadia, 2010;
Gale and Yorulmazer, 2013). Liquidity hoarding can also be motivated by avoiding predatory trading
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005), which is selling illiquid assets on spot market at a discount, and
speculative motives (arbitrage through taking advantage of fire sales; Gale and Yorulmazer, 2013).
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Farhi and Tirole (2012) show, increasing the riskiness of balance sheets (and thus the
risk of contagion) can be beneficial in the light of government intervention. In their
discussion of the formation of bubbles, Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) argue that
bubbles arise because traders do not act in the interest of a functioning market, but
maximise expected profit based on their own information and payoff structure. For
instance, a trader selling under pressure takes into account her losses, but not those
that accrue to the overall system by depressed prices as a consequence of her actions.
While the Babus model offers a benchmark for minimising exposure risk, its underlying
assumptions are somewhat incomplete.
Farhi and Tirole (2012) show how government intervention in the form of bailouts
can distort the interbank market. They show that when governments cannot tailor their
policies sufficiently, it is optimal for banks to take on extra leverage as long as they
do so in a coordinated fashion, because increasing the riskiness of balance sheets of
individual banks is a strategic substitute in the presence of government intervention.
Others have argued that banks coordinate their behaviour in making investment deci-
sions in order to fail together and benefit from ensuing government support (Acharya
and Yorulmazer, 2007; Eisert and Eufinger, 2013) and that banks can shift systemic risk
to the government by such coordinated behaviour (Acharya, 2009). Eisert and Eufinger’s
(2013) model is one example in which banks enter circular lending relationships across
national borders. If there is a fixed bailout probability in case of a bank’s default in
each country, entering lending relationships that involve more countries minimises the
risk of an uninsured creditor. Farhi and Tirole and Acharya and Yorulmazer argue for a
collision between banks in order to take advantage of a government subsidy. In contrast,
in the model of Eisert and Eufinger it is optimal for a bank to enter interbank lending
relationships (cross-border) regardless of the action of other banks. Similarly, Leitner
(2005) argues that banks have a private incentive to enter potentially risky interbank
lending relationships, because it increases the likelihood of a private sector bailout. In
his model agents face a tradeoff between exposing themselves to a higher contagion risk,
while at the same time insuring themselves. The historical rescue of Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM) has shown that private consortia can rescue financial institutions.
As argued above most existing models assume that interbank lending exists as a con-
sequence of liquidity shocks. Krause and Reed-Tsochas (2016) develop a model showing
that even in the absence of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks interbank markets can emerge
if interbank exposures affect the perceived probability of a bank to be bailed out in the
case of default. The work adds to complementary theories of the interbank market and
offers an additional explanation for why interbank exposures can emerge. Whether a
bailout would be private or government driven is inconsequential to the model. For in-
terbank markets to emerge uncertainty regarding bailouts needs to exist. The extent and
nature of this uncertainty depends on the market environment and jurisdiction in which
banks are based. The 2007-2009 financial crisis provided a range of examples, where
bank bailouts have been decided on a case-by-case basis. The model therefore uses a
cumulative probability function that provides an estimate of the likelihood of bank lia-
bilities being guaranteed. The function contains two parameters, a bailout threshold and
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an uncertainty parameter, which can be estimated for different temporal and regional
conditions to reflect political realities. As this study is confined to just one jurisdiction,
it unfortunately cannot address differences between jurisdictions.
Interbank borrowing is rational for banks if there exists uncertainty regarding a
bailout. However, it is never optimal for all banks in a system to engage symmetrically
in interbank lending and never optimal if no uncertainty regarding bailouts exist. The
model in Krause and Reed-Tsochas (2016) shows that if a positive bailout probability
exists and it is uncertain, some banks will lend heavily to others, who invest in a risky
technology. They employ a representation of a bailout probability that links the bal-
ance sheet composition of a bank to the likelihood of it being bailed out in the case of
insolvency using the work by Glasserman and Young (2015) to describe the systemic
importance of a bank.
This overview of the emergent literature on alternative drivers of the interbank mar-
ket allows one to formulate a testable hypothesis. In addition to satisfying liquidity
needs, private banks may rely on the interbank market in order to manage their prob-
ability of being bailed out when distressed. As Eisert and Eufinger (2013) argue, for
instance, the motivation to engage in circular lending relationships stems from protect-
ing uninsured depositors. A higher likelihood of bailout reduces the default risk of loans
for creditors, which implies lower borrowing costs for such banks. Thus, if otherwise
comparable banks of which some are publicly owned or their liabilities guaranteed, one
ought to expect those without guarantees to use the interbank market strategically to
improve their bailout probability. The following hypothesis summarises this expectation:
H2 For private banks, an increase in liabilities to other banks is positively correlated
with an increase of the bailout probability of a bank.
2 The banking sector and interbank market in Germany
The structure of the German banking sector can be used to identify various drivers of
banks to be active in the interbank market by comparing changes in interbank liabilities
of different bank types. Before outlining the method of identifying such drivers, we
provide a brief overview of the German interbank market. The sum total of bank assets
grew from 6.3 trillion Euros in 2002 to 8.7 trillion Euros in 2012 (non-inflation-adjusted),
with total interbank liabilities growing from 1.8 trillion Euros to 2.3 trillion in the third
Quarter of 2008 and dropping to 2 trillion in 2012 (cf. Figure 1). This compares to a
GDP of 3.5 trillion USD in 2012.5 This simple comparison illustrates the importance of
the interbank market in Germany. On-balance-sheet interbank liabilities are equivalent
in size to two thirds of GDP.
The German interbank market can also be studied from a structural perspective
using measures from network theory, where liability exposures constitute links between
banks. While not the focus of the paper, it is important to note that the structure of the
interbank market is stable. Interbank exposures are part of on-balance-sheet interbank
5Cf. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD [Accessed 11 January 2015].
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Figure 1: Total banking assets and interbank lending in Germany
The graph shows total assets of banks, i.e. the size of the banking sector in Ger-
many, and compares them to total interbank loans and advances (interbank assets),
as well as interbank liabilities. Source: Created by author, based on Monatliche
Bilanzstatistik, Deutsche Bundesbank, November 2013.
Private 
commercial 
banks (144)!
Savings banks 
(412)!
Credit 
cooperatives 
(1083)!
Subsidiaries of 
foreign banks 
(41)!
Other banks 
(68)!
Figure 2: The German banking sector in 2012
The figure shows the composition of the German banking sector by asset size and
states the number of banks for each type. The graph is for the third quarter of 2012,
when the size of the banking sector was 8.6 trillion Euro. Source: Created by author,
based on Monatliche Bilanzstatistik, Deutsche Bundesbank, April 2014.
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lending and borrowing, which form part of variables used in this study. The regressions
control for structural factors to ensure that they do not drive results. Domestic bilat-
eral exposures are reported to the central bank in quarterly intervals if they are larger
than 1.5m EUR.6 Roukny, Georg and Battiston (2014) provide a detailed network-based
description of the German OTC market for credit exposures as well as derivative ex-
posures. They find that the structure of the interbank network is mostly stable, also
throughout and after the 2007-2009 financial crisis. However, they identify a spike in
derivative exposures in its run-up. Both for credit exposures and derivative exposures it
is shown that few important players exist in the market, which concentrate exposures.
Table 7 shows some further network measures. In 2012, 1681 banks had 21741 bilateral
liability exposure relationships between them. One can see from some simple network
measures that the interbank exposure network in Germany exhibits a small diameter (4
or 5), which means that all banks are separated by liability exposures through at most
4 other banks.7 It shows that contagious shocks can reach most banks quickly. At the
same time one sees high clustering (larger than 0.8) and a low density (smaller than
0.01), which shows that while banks tend to interact with similar counter parties when
they lend to or borrow from each other, most banks do not share bilateral exposures.8
However, it would be misleading to regard the German banking sector as a collective
of comparable entities. It comprises private commercial banks, both domestic banks
and subsidiaries of non-German banks, state-owned banks, savings banks, credit coop-
eratives, and other banks or bank-like institutions. For instance, a financial services
arm of a consumer company, such as a car manufacturer that offers financing solutions
to its customers, holds a banking license. Volkswagen Bank GmbH or Mercedes-Benz
Bank AG are examples of such entities. This analysis focuses on universal banks, also
frequently referred to as credit banks, which take deposits, or otherwise raise capital, in
order to lend to consumers and businesses. These bank types perform the characteristic
maturity transformation function described by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in that they
transform illiquid assets (such as loans) and liquid liabilities (such as deposits). Fur-
thermore, focusing on these banking groups avoids distortions to the analysis that could
arise from including special-purpose banks such as state-owned banks (Landesbanken) or
development banks, both of which have very specific objectives that are not necessarily
related to maturity transformation.
Credit banks comprise domestic private commercial banks, subsidiaries of foreign
commercial banks, credit cooperatives, and savings banks. These banks pursue similar
business models even though they differ greatly in their governance structure. As the
6It is important to note that reported exposures includes all liabilities, including off-balance-sheet
exposures and exposures from derivatives not necessarily shown on the balance-sheet. At the same time,
on-balance-sheet liabilities will also include liabilities smaller than EUR 1.5m. So, while both measures
are informative in conjunction, they cannot be compared directly.
7The diameter of a network is the longest shortest path between any two nodes of a network, cf.
Jackson (2008) or Appendix A.
8We use transitivity as a measure of clustering. It is the extent to which so-called transitive triplets
are present in the network. Density is the existing number of links in a network divided by the possible
number of links in a network. Appendix A contains precise definitions of these measures. Also cf.
Jackson (2008) or Newman (2010) for details.
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ultimate ownership and control of foreign private commercial banks rests in non-German
institutions, those banks are excluded from the analysis because no information on the
parent entities is available in the data. It is apparent from the composition of the
balance sheets of these banks (cf. Table 1) that the main source of funding is derived
from foreign bank liabilities, presumably held against the parent bank. The majority
of interbank liabilities (and often of all liabilities, cf. Table 2) are long-term and with
foreign banks.9 We thus distinguish the four types of credit banks in this section and
subsume all remaining banks under the label ‘other banks’. In the ensuing description
we describe all entities with a banking license in Germany as part of set B, (domestic)
private commercial banks members of set U ⊂ B, credit cooperatives members of set
C ⊂ B, and savings banks members of set S ⊂ B, where U , C, and S do not overlap.
Figure 2 shows that, whilst in terms of quantity the majority of banks are not private
commercial banks but savings banks and credit cooperatives, private commercial banks
make up for more than half of assets in the German banking sector.
Private commercial banks comprise large publicly-traded banks such as Deutsche
Bank AG, Commerzbank AG, or Deutsche Postbank AG as well as smaller private
banks that may have a regional or industry focus. Bankhaus Sal. Oppenheim10, HSBC
Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG, and HSH Nordbank AG are examples of such smaller banks.
Private commercial banks are predominantly structured as profit-oriented companies
and do not enjoy federal or municipal government guarantees for their liabilities. Their
interbank lending activities (cf. Table 1 panel a) and borrowing activities (cf. Table
1 panel b) are split approximately evenly between domestic and non-German counter
parties, with a tendency to longer-term contracts. Moreover, private commercial banks
in aggregate have approximately as many interbank assets as interbank liabilities. This
intra-bank-type balance of lending and borrowing is consistent with the intermediation
function of the interbank market which relies on interbank liabilities to channel excess
funds to profitable investment opportunities.11 Given the regional focus of credit co-
operatives and savings banks one would expect less such channeling of funds towards
investment opportunities (interbank assets) by these bank types, which is indeed con-
sistent with the data. Commercial bank deposits are insured up to 100,000 Euro by
federal law and, in addition, private banks operate a mutual trust fund through which
they self-insure deposits beyond that level (Bankenverband, 2015).
Savings banks constitute a central part of the German banking system. While in
terms of their services and activities comparable to private commercial banks, savings
banks are publicly owned and structured accordingly (Schlierbach and Pu¨ttner, 2003).
Savings banks have special relationships to their respective state banks (‘Landesbanken’),
which provide a source of refinancing and are predominantly owned by local or municipal
government, which can be one city or a union of several cities. This control structure
implies that liabilities are ultimately publicly guaranteed by the financial prowess of the
9This observation supports limitations of Minoiu and Reyes’s (2013) study in the sense that
widespread claims of an increasing connectedness of the financial system may just reflect an increase in
the globalisation of the financial industry.
10Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie. AG & Co. KGaA
11Cf. Farboodi (2014) for a recent contribution to this literature and an overview of important works.
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Private 
commercial 
banks
Savings 
banks
Credit 
cooperatives
Foreign 
commercial 
banks Other Total
Short-term 560 42 33 15 407 1057
Long-term 835 45 34 81 61 1055
Total 1395 87 67 96 467
Domestic 684 83 65 46 404 1282
Foreign 711 4 2 50 63 829
Total 1395 87 67 96 467
a) Interbank assets in billion Euros
Private 
commercial 
banks
Savings 
banks
Credit 
cooperatives
Foreign 
commercial 
banks Other Total
Short-term 566 141 89 21 140 956
Long-term 778 26 16 91 70 981
Total 1344 167 105 111 210
Domestic 693 166 103 12 163 1137
Foreign 651 1 2 99 47 801
Total 1344 167 105 112 210
a) Interbank liabilities in billion Euros
Table 1: Composition of German interbank assets and liabilities in 2012
The table shows aggregate interbank assets and liabilities for four banking groups in
Germany. Private commercial banks excludes foreign commercial banks. It cate-
gorises interbank lending and borrowing according to location of counter party (do-
mestic and foreign) and maturity of contract (short-term and long-term). Short-
term is defined as maturities of less than one month. Differences in sums are due
to the effects of rounding.
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city or collective of cities backing a savings bank. Moreover, in addition to the deposit
insurance provided by the federal government, savings banks as a collective operate an
additional deposit insurance fund.
Credit cooperatives are mutually owned by depositors and are private banks. These
institutions are similar to savings banks in their regional focus, but are not controlled
or owned by local government. The extent of interbank market activities of credit
cooperatives is comparable with that of savings banks (cf. Table 1), especially when
comparing them in percentage terms (cf. Figure 3). Moreover, both bank types almost
exclusively transact with domestic counter parties and have higher interbank liabilities
than assets. While interbank assets tend to be both long-term and short-term, liabilities
are predominantly short-term, which is consistent with the hypothesis that banks use
the interbank market to satisfy liquidity needs.
In summary, the German banking sector consists of a range of bank types of which
domestic universal banks make up approximately 80% of total assets and more than
90% of banks.12 These universal banks comprise three types differing markedly in their
governance structure: private commercial banks, publicly-owned savings banks, and
mutually-owned but private credit cooperatives.
3 Identifying drivers of interbank markets
In order to conclusively investigate whether incentives other than liquidity management
are driving interbank markets, the German banking sector, in which universal banks
with similar business models but different governance structures operate, offers a suit-
able setting. While one would expect differences in interbank lending behaviour between
private commercial banks and the more regionally oriented credit cooperatives and sav-
ings banks, the latter two are comparable with one being publicly owned and the other
one privately owned. We thus use a difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff) model to ex-
amine whether increases in bailout probabilities correlate positively with increases in
interbank borrowing for credit cooperatives in excess of what would be expected based
on savings banks interbank market behaviour. No direct measure of bailout probabilities
exist of course. The analysis therefore relies on a proxy indicator, which we present in
this section. The data used in this analysis combines two confidential data sets available
at the Deutsche Bundesbank. We first describe the data before presenting the identi-
fication strategy used to test the competing hypotheses. Lastly, we comment on the
variables and analysis.
3.1 Data
According to section 7 of the German Banking Act (KWG) of 1998 the supervision
of banks rests with the Deutsche Bundesbank. Basis for the analysis are two self-
reported datasets collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The first exists due to directive
12Domestic universal banks is equivalent to credit banks ‘Kreditbanken’ in standard Bundesbank
classification, but excluding subsidiaries of international banks.
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2006/48/EC. According to this European Commission directive banks are required to
report balance sheet information on a monthly basis in the ‘Monatliche Bilanzstatis-
tik’ (BISTA). The second is based on sections 13 and 14 of the German Banking Act,
which require banks to provide quarterly reports of bilateral liability exposures in which
they act as creditors for all credit exposures larger than EUR 1.5m (collected by the
Millionenkreditevidenzzentrale or credit register). Banks report exposures at the end of
the quarter if at any point during the quarter this threshold has been exceeded. The
exposure data contains all on and off balance sheet exposures between institutions in
Germany. Thus, only for domestic banks bilateral exposures are known. The balance
sheet information contains both domestic as well as international loans and advances to
banks, as well as domestic and international bank liabilities.
For a satisfactory analysis of the role of interbank markets both sets of information
are combined into one dataset. The dataset brings together balance sheet information as
well as bilateral liability exposures on a quarterly basis for 43 periods from 2002 Q1 until
2012 Q3. In the time period between 2002 and 2012 one sees between 1741 (2003Q1)
and 1762 (2009Q2) active banks in the interbank market that between them have over
20000 bilateral exposure relationships in each period. Due to reporting requirements,
only exposures greater than EUR 1.5m (at some point of the reporting window) are
included in the data. Table 7 offers some descriptive statistics of the total exposure
network in each time period that include some network measures.
In order to work with the data, an extensive cleaning process as outlined below
was necessary. It has been formalised in a software, which is now available as open
source code.13 Banks report liability exposures to firms as well as to other banks at
a level of legal entity. Banks often encompass a number of legal entities. The data
cleaning started with deleting all bank-firm liability exposures. Left just with bank-
bank liability exposures at a legal entity level, exposures are aggregated to the level
of bank holding companies. In the process, idiosyncrasies in the data (such as double
counting of exposures for specific legal forms of banks, different identifiers for creditors
and debtors, as well as mergers and acquisitions) are resolved. The process is applied
both to the balance sheet information as well as the bilateral exposure information, so
that the resulting banks are fully consistent across datasets. The final dataset contains
full information over a ten-year period of the bilateral liability exposures of banks, paired
with all relevant balance sheet information on a quarterly basis.
3.2 Glasserman & Young indicator
To proxy the bailout probability of a bank we use a balance-sheet-based indicator for the
systemic importance of a bank. We rely on work of Glasserman and Young (2015) who
develop a measure for a threshold at which the failure of a bank would have contagious
consequences. Given the small number of bank bailouts globally and the fact that
they usually occur during crises rather then ‘normal’ times, it is difficult to measure
13Available at: http://www.netgen-toolbox.org. Main software engineer is Tarik Roukny, Jens Krause
is a co-developer.
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accurately what influences the perceived or real probability of a bank to be bailed out.
Anecdotally, banks most likely to cause contagious defaults in the case of their own
default, thus posing a threat to the stability of the financial system as a whole, are more
likely to be bailed out. We thus assume that the more likely contagious consequences,
the more likely a bank would get bailed out.
We use Ai to denote the total assets of a bank i, which is sometimes just referred to as
bank size, AIBi and L
IB
i to denote interbank assets and interbank liabilities respectively,
as well as wi to denote equity. In order to assess the importance of different banks, let
βi ∈ [0, 1] be as in Glasserman and Young (2015):14
βi =
LIBi
LIBi + L
O
i
, (1)
where LOi are liabilities to outside of the financial sector such as deposits. β is a measure
of relative exposure of the banking sector to an institution compared to the exposure
of non-banking actors. Glasserman and Young show that the likelihood of contagion in
financial systems from shocks to individual entities depends on the βis of those entities.
Their theorem 1 states that contagion from one institution to a set of banks D excluding
i is impossible if the following condition holds true:∑
j∈D,j 6=i
wj/wi > βi(λi − 1), (2)
where wi is the equity (or net worth) of a bank and
λi = (L
O
i /wi), (3)
constitutes the leverage of non-banking liabilities. Simplifying slightly, the higher an
entity’s βi, the higher the likelihood that adverse shocks to this entity will spill over to
other entities in the system.
We use the RHS of Eq. 2 as a proxy for bailout probability and define ψi as the
G&Y indicator for a bank:
ψi = βi(λi − 1). (4)
The higher the indicator, the higher the bailout probability. The larger the liabilities
to other banks relative to total liabilities, the higher the indicator. The larger the ratio
of non-financial assets to equity, the larger the indicator. For the sake of the present
analysis we thus assume that those banks most exposed to the real economy (leverage
ratio excluding banks, λi) and to whom the banking sector is disproportionally exposed
(higher βi) are more likely to be bailed out. Of course the absolute size (Ai) of an
institution is relevant here, which is why all regressions include size as a control.
14The Glasserman and Young βi is not to be confused with that of the CAPM model, to which it is
unrelated.
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3.3 Main variables and hypothesis test
In order to test the hypotheses developed above one needs to overcome two challenges.
The first is identifying the variables described in the hypotheses, including interbank
borrowing and an indicator for the probability of being bailed out. We refine the devel-
oped hypotheses to make them testable given the available data. Second, one needs to
account for the fact that bilateral lending and borrowing decisions are influenced by an
array of factors such as the position of a bank in the interbank market, leverage, and
other bank-specific factors that are not relevant for the analysis.
It is impossible to determine the precise amount of interbank borrowing from bal-
ance sheet or exposure information. This would require one to know exact maturities
of interbank loans and interbank credits of individual institutions. Assuming that at an
aggregate level maturities of new loans or credits are similarly distributed as those of
existing ones, which again seems to be a conservative assumption under stable macroe-
conomic conditions, we approximate interbank borrowing of a bank with the change in
net liabilities to other banks φi:
φi = log
(
LIBi,t
AIBi,t
AIBi,t−1
LIBi,t−1
)
. (5)
Variations of the analysis that are run as controls use net interbank borrowing at dif-
ferent maturities. Short-term interbank borrowing are all loans with a maturity of less
than one month, denoted by φST . Long-term interbank borrowing is denoted by φLT and
summarises all loans with longer than a one-month maturity. In addition to net inter-
bank borrowing, alternative specifications of the model are studied using gross interbank
borrowing, which is simply
φ′i = log
(
LIBit /L
IB
it−1
)
. (6)
A liquidity need can arise because banks redistribute liquidity in an economy or
because of regional or temporal liquidity shocks. However, neither the daily liquidity
need of banks, nor their precise day-to-day interaction on the interbank market are
readily available. In this work we therefore ignore bilateral interactions. We consider
two sources of liquidity needs: loans and deposits. As one cannot observe maturities of
loans, we assume that in each period new loans on average have the same maturity as
old loans, so that approximately the same amount of loans expire as are granted. This
assumption seems valid in most periods as long as macroeconomic conditions are stable.
The regressions include time fixed effects to account for changes in these conditions. So,
the difference in loans to households and firms (identified simply as loans in the following)
between two periods is approximately the net lending to households and firms. Similarly
for deposits. The difference in deposits between two periods is approximately the inflow
or outflow of liquidity. We therefore define liquidity need of a bank θi:
θi = log
(
Hi,t
Di,t
Di,t−1
Hi,t−1
)
, (7)
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where Hi,t and Hi,t−1 are bank i’s loans to households and firms in period t and t − 1
respectively, and similarly for Di,t and deposits.
With these definitions, hypothesis H1 becomes testable. We may formulate a general
expectation for all banks and, given the access to alternative means of funding such as
bond markets of private commercial banks, a separate one for commercial banks.
H1a An increase in φi is positively and strongly correlated with an increase θi.
H1b The correlation between an increase in φi and an increase in θi, while positive,
is smaller for private commercial banks than it is for savings banks and credit
cooperatives.
In order to test whether private banks manage their liabilities to other banks strate-
gically as argued in Krause and Reed-Tsochas (2016) and outlined in the section above,
we use the interperiod difference of the G&Y indicator ∆ψi as an explanatory variable:
∆ψi = log
(
ψi,t
ψi,t−1
)
. (8)
To test whether this indicator is the best proxy for strategic behaviour in the interbank
market is beyond the scope of this study, but the findings are in line with theoretical
arguments motivating the hypotheses tested. In order to determine whether interbank
market activities of private banks are at least partially motivated by influencing their
bailout probability it is necessary to isolate what relationship between interbank borrow-
ing and the change in the G&Y indicator would be expected purely due to their business
model and the balance sheet identity. Fortunately, savings banks and credit coopera-
tives are comparable in their business model so that savings banks provide a baseline
for comparison as a public bank with guaranteed liabilities. Controlling for bank and
time fixed effects, estimating a diff-in-diff model for those two bank types allows one to
estimate the desired effect. One can thus test H2 as follows:
H2 For credit cooperatives there is a significant positive correlation between φi and ψi
above the benchmark established by savings banks.
3.4 Control variables
The interbank market is ultimately determined by bilateral interbank lending and inter-
bank borrowing decisions that are influenced by a multitude of bank-specific variables
and macroeconomic factors. In order to account for these factors, we use a fixed effects
model to account for bank-specific factors and include time period dummy variables. It
has also been documented that the German interbank market is tiered and that charac-
teristics such as bank size determine which bank is a central actor in the market (Craig
and von Peter, 2014). In addition to controlling for size, it is therefore necessary to also
control for the position of a bank in the interbank market.
Before discussing control variables, some notation is necessary. A liability exposure
between bank i and bank j is identified as lij . In this relationship lij represents the
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total liability exposure of i to j. For instance, if the exposure consists of an interbank
loan, i is the creditor and j the debtor. We use bilateral exposures to derive some
network measures used in addition to balance sheet items. The interbank network can be
represented by the adjacency matrix L = [lij ]
n,n
i=1,j=1, which records all bilateral liability
exposures between n banks. Let Ωouti (Ω
in
i ) define the set of banks that are debtors
(creditors) to i. douti = |Ωouti | (dini = |Ωini |) denotes the number of debtors (creditors) of
a bank.
The most important control variable is bank size. Size is measured simply as total
assets Ai. All changes in the overall balance sheet that are not part of the explanatory
variables or the dependent variable are controlled for in addition to other structural
factors likely to influence interbank activities. These controls include other assets (∆Ao),
changes in other liabilities (∆Lo), and changes in equity (∆w). Leverage is defined
as the size of the balance sheet divided by equity or Ai/wi. The level of intragroup
lending, denoted by Gi, is derived from bilateral exposure information and is the sum of
exposures between subsidiaries of the same bank. The creditor-to-debtor ratio, denoted
by Ri, is
Ωini
Ωouti
and controls for changes in the composition of lending counter parties of a
bank. The centrality of a bank, denoted by Cei in the interbank market is measured by
eigenvector centrality as defined in Jackson (2008), because it is sensitive to importance
of the neighbours as well as to the number of counter parties of a bank.15 Eigenvector
centrality of bank i is the i-th entry of the eigenvector of L associated with the largest
eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix.16
3.5 Diff-in-diff model and analysis
The analysis relies on the G&Y indicator as the main explanatory variable, which is a
factor rather than a monetary difference in balance sheet items. It is thus necessary
to treat all changes in balance sheet items as percentage changes rather than absolute
changes. In order to estimate the model with OLS, logarithmic transformations are
applied to the variables as appropriate. Given balance sheet items cannot be zero or
negative, a simple logarithmic transformation of the form log(v) is used on the original
variables v. In the case of first differences a logarithmic difference of the form log(vt/vt−1)
is used. Table 8 shows some descriptive statistics of non-transformed variables.
Tables 9 and 10 show the correlation matrices of the variables used in the regression
models and shows that no confounding effects from collinearity are to be expected. Each
liability exposure that ever existed between two counter parties is reported in every time
period and is zero when no actual exposure exists. As all of the data is audited and
the dataset contains the entire population of banks in Germany, outliers were treated
conservatively. Only banks with negative equity values are excluded from the analysis.17
15Other measures for centrality such as betweeness-centrality or degree centrality have been used but
dropped for collinearity reasons.
16An alternative measure for a banks centrality is the debtrank proposed by Battiston et al. (2012c).
17Only a few of those cases exist in the dataset. If a bank goes bankrupt it is often still required to
report to the Deutsche Bundesbank, which explains occasional negative entries for equity.
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In order to identify the differences between bank behaviour, a traditional diff-in-diff
model (Abadie, 2005; Ashenfelter and Card, 1985; Card and Krueger, 1994) is used. The
interaction effects of the diff-in-diff dummy Di for a given bank type and the explanatory
variables liquidity need (D × θ) and changes of the G &Y indicator (D ×∆ψ) provide
the differential effect of a specific bank type. The OLS regressions control for bank fixed
effects by demeaning as well as for time fixed effects by the inclusion of time dummy
variables. A Hausman test shows conclusively that the within fixed effects model is to be
preferred to a random effects model, which is in line with the theoretical understanding of
differences in business models of banks.18 To be precise, the following model is estimated:
(φit− φ¯i) = b0(xit− x¯i) +b1Di× (xit− x¯i) +b2(zit− z¯i) +Tt +Tt×Di + (it− ¯i), (9)
where xit is the vector of explanatory variables θit and ψit, zit the vector of control
variables, Tt a vector with dummy variables for time periods, and Di the dummy variable
indicating whether a bank is a member of the banking group of interest, and bj for
j = 0, 1, 2 the estimated parameters. The same model is used to estimate the effect of
the 2007/2008 financial crisis by including an additional dummy identifying the post-
crisis period in addition to the interaction effect with explanatory variables.
All analysis has been conducted using Stata 12 on premises of the Deutsche Bun-
desbank. To estimate the confidence interval of coefficients, a robust non-parametric
estimator is used.
4 Results
We first show that universal banks in Germany are predominantly not only lenders or
borrowers in the interbank market, but both. Moreover, we briefly describe the evolution
of the G&Y β, leverage, and asset and liability ratios for the different bank groups in
Germany. We then show that interbank market activities of private banks in Germany
do indeed correlate with changes in the bailout probability of banks. Moreover, we
show that for private commercial banks the liquidity management function is much less
important than for savings banks and credit cooperatives. Lastly, it is shown that these
results are not affected by the 2007/2008 financial crisis.
Table 2 shows the distribution of the proportion of interbank assets and liabilities
of the overall balance sheet size, as well as the balance between the two. While it is
clear that the distribution of the proportion of interbank asset and liabilities of total
asset (AIBi /Ai and L
IB/Ai respectively) is highly dispersed among banks of the same
type, some simple insights can be gained. Banks neither tend to be just borrowers nor
just lenders. This insight follows from the ratio between interbank assets and interbank
liabilities in Table 2. Private commercial banks and credit cooperatives both have more
balanced lending to borrowing ratios than savings banks. Of course, banks fulfil an
intermediation role (cf. Farboodi, 2014) as noted above. If banks channel excess funding
to profitable investment opportunities through intermediation chains it is to be expected
18The result of the Hausman test is a X2 = 304.41.
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Figure 3: Evolution of interbank assets and liabilities ratios
The figure shows the evolution of the median ratio of interbank assets (liabilities)
to total assets between 2002 and 2012 for three types of universal credit banks in
Germany. Source: Created by author, based on Monatliche Bilanzstatistik, Deutsche
Bundesbank, April 2014.
Bank type
median 0.21 0.14 0.35
IQR 0.32 0.27 0.59
median 0.07 0.19 0.36
IQR 0.07 0.13 0.43
median 0.10 0.12 0.52
IQR 0.09 0.08 0.42
median 0.47 0.73 0.54
IQR 0.53 0.33 0.61
median 0.11 0.12 0.48
IQR 0.09 0.08 0.42
Private commercial banks 
(n=5767)
Savings banks          
(n=17822)
Credit cooperatives 
(n=46546)
Foreign commercial banks 
(n=1501)
Other banks                 
(n=1668)
AIBi
Ai
LIBi
Ai
min{LIBi , AIBi }
max{LIBi , AIBi }
Table 2: Characteristic interbank lending ratios in Germany
The table shows the distribution of characteristic interbank lending and borrowing
ratios for different bank types. The first column shows the interbank asset ratio,
the second the interbank liability ratio. Both are calculated as a ratio of balance
sheet size. The third column gives an indication of the balance between interbank
assets and liabilities of a bank. Source: Created by author, based on Monatliche
Bilanzstatistik, Deutsche Bundesbank, April 2014.
that at least some banks will have both high levels of interbank assets and liabilities.
Generally, it must be noted that interbank lending and borrowing can make up
for a large portion of the balance sheet, with private commercial banks showing much
higher levels of both lending and borrowing than other universal banks. Figure 3 further
shows the evolution of interbank assets and liabilities ratios (
∑
i∈B A
IB
i /
∑
i∈B A
i and∑
i∈B L
IB
i /
∑
i∈B A
i respectively) for the different bank types (C, U , and S). Across all
bank types, the level of interbank loans increased since 2002 until the 2008 financial crisis
and decreased significantly thereafter. This drop is more pronounced for savings banks
and credit cooperatives. On the other hand, the ratio of interbank liabilities declined
slightly over time, but rose significantly for credit cooperatives since the financial crisis.
Figure 4 shows the median ψs for the three bank types, while Figure 5 shows leverage
ratios. For private commercial banks leverage ratios stayed at similar levels up to the
financial crisis with a sudden drop during 2008 and a steady decline since. The G&Y
ψ peaks in 2009 and drops afterwards. Generally it declines steadily over time. For
savings banks and credit cooperatives we see a decline in leverage ratios up to 2008,
which stayed steady since. The G&Y ψ for credit cooperatives is stable while decreasing
slightly over time for savings banks. Comparing between the different bank types, ψs
between private commercial banks and savings banks have been comparable in 2002,
in 2012 private commercial bank ψs are closer to credit cooperatives. While the ψs
of savings banks are always higher than those for credit cooperatives, their medians
declined roughly in tandem up to the financial crisis and since then are converging.
Thus, while there are some differences between the universal bank types, which are
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Figure 4: Glasserman & Young ψ for German universal banks 2002-2012
The graph shows median ψs for different bank types in Germany. ψ is calculated as
in Eq. 2.4. The graph distinguishes private commercial banks, savings banks, and
credit cooperatives. Source: Created by author, based on Monatliche Bilanzstatistik,
Deutsche Bundesbank, November 2013.
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Figure 5: Leverage for German universal banks 2002-2012
The graph shows median leverage ratios (Total Assets / Equity) for different banking
groups in Germany. Source: Created by author, based on Monatliche Bilanzstatistik,
Deutsche Bundesbank, November 2013.
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controlled for in all regressions by including bank fixed effect, savings banks, credit
cooperatives, and private commercial banks are comparable. It is clear from Table 2
that foreign commercial banks are structured differently. Interbank liabilities make up
for the largest proportion of the liabilities of these banks. They are thus excluded from
the regression models on which the following results are based.
4.1 Effect of interbank market activity on systemic importance for
private banks
Amongst universal banks, two types of private banks exist that are not directly or
indirectly publicly owned: credit cooperatives and private commercial banks. The de-
scription of the interbank market above shows that commercial banks are structurally
different from the other two. However, savings banks and credit cooperatives are com-
parable. Therefore, in order to identify whether the activities of private banks in the
interbank market influence their bailout probability, the estimated model including a
dummy for credit cooperatives allows one to estimate the relationship between the G&Y
indicator (∆ψ) and net interbank borrowing (θ) attributable to being a private bank.
Table 3 shows the results of this analysis. Model (1) shows a strongly significant
correlation between a change in the G&Y indicator of the baseline model for savings
banks. When introducing control variables (Models 2 to 7), the direction of the effect
is preserved, even though it is not always significant. For savings banks, the interbank
market activity shows a negative correlation with the bailout probability indicator, even
though it is not always statistically significant. An increase in net borrowing would be
associated with a reduction in the bailout probability, even if small. However, for credit
cooperatives one can identify a strongly significant and positive correlation between
net interbank borrowing and the indicator. This effect is in excess of the negative
effect of the baseline established by savings banks and stable with the introduction of
different control variables, as well as estimating the same model but with a savings bank
dummy (cf. Table 11). Thus, for private banks with uninsured liabilities, interbank
market activities are associated with a change in the bailout probability proxy. One can
therefore conclude that in addition to the liquidity management function, the interbank
market also fulfils a strategic bailout probability management function.
Table 12 in Appendix C shows that the described effect is also present when analysing
short-term net interbank borrowing only. Moreover, when comparing all universal banks
(cf. Table 5), the effect is preserved too. Throughout all models in which credit coop-
eratives and savings banks are used to establish a benchmark, a highly significant and
positive effect exists for private commercial banks. That is, even in excess of the higher
benchmark established by credit cooperatives, for commercial banks the correlation be-
tween a higher bailout probability and an increase in net interbank borrowing is stronger.
The effect is also present when analysing gross interbank borrowing. Table 4 es-
timates several models for gross short-term interbank borrowing and controls include
changes in short-term interbank assets. Interestingly, an increase in short-term inter-
bank borrowing is positively correlated to short-term interbank lending, even though
the effect is small. While the G&Y indicator is positively correlated with interbank
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Coefficients of diff-in-diff model of change in net liabilities to other banks (Φ)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Independent variables
Liquidity need (θ) 5.16*** 6.1*** 6.07*** 6.32*** 6.08*** 6.32*** 6.68***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.34*** -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.22*
(0.000) (0.152) (0.192) (0.199) (0.192) (0.185) (0.018)
-0.74 -0.21 -0.23 -0.45 -0.21 -0.45 -0.74
(0.217) (0.745) (0.729) (0.453) (0.75) (0.453) (0.211)
0.42*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.49***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Control variables
1.88*** 1.89*** 1.9*** 1.9*** 1.9*** 2.17***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.83*** -0.82*** -0.82*** -0.83*** -0.82*** -0.7***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank size (A) -0.1*** -0.1*** -0.1*** -0.1*** -0.04***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage (A/w) -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.14***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
-1.35***
(0.000)
0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.04 0.0 -0.01 -0.01
(0.118) (0.833) (0.542) (0.662)
-0.03 -0.02
(0.108) (0.326)
Time FE (not shown)
Time x Credit cooperative dummy 
FE (not shown)
Bank FE (not shown)
Observations 62590 62590 62590 61360 61460 61460 61460
Number of groups 1632 1632 1632 1617 1617 1617 1617
Error Standard Deviation 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.45
Fixed-effect variance 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.03
Goodness of Fit (adj.) 0.17 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29
F-Statistic (all coeff=0) 53.14 52.93 52.25 50.01 51.05 49.9 48.6
                                                          Legend: coefficient/(p-value); * p < 0.05,** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Change of G&Y indicator (ΔΨ)
Change of G&Y indicator (ΔΨ) x    
Credit cooperative dummy
Centrality in interbank market 
(Ce)
Liquidity need (θ) x                    
Credit cooperative dummy
Change of intragroup lending 
(ΔG)
Change of other assets (ΔAo)
Change of other liabilities (ΔLo)
Change of equity (Δw)
Change of creditor/debtor ratio 
(ΔR)
Table 3: Main model for effect of credit cooperatives
The regression table shows coefficients and p-values for several diff-in-diff models estimated for all savings
banks and credit cooperatives. They regress net liabilities to other banks on two independent variables
and some bank-level control variables. The models include interaction effects for credit cooperatives and
the explanatory variables in order to analyse whether credit cooperatives show different effects to savings
banks. Where appropriate, variables are log-differences and a robust non-parametric estimator is used to
calculate standard errors. Change in net liabilities to other banks is interperiod change of net interbank
borrowing. Liquidity need is the difference of interperiod changes in loans and interperiod changes in
deposits. The G&Y indicator gives an indication of the importance of a bank to the financial system.
Control variables account for bank size and leverage, its position in the interbank market, and changes
to the balance sheet that would mechanically change net liabilities to other banks. All models control for
bank fixed effects, time fixed effects, and time-dummy interaction effects from the diff-in-diff model. Data
sources: Monatliche Bilanzstatistik and Millionenevidenzdaten (both from Deutsche Bundesbank).
Coefficients of diff-in-diff model of change in gross short-term interbank liabilities (Φ'ST)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent variables
Change of interbank assets (ΔAIB) 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Liquidity need (θ) 0.28** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.27***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.17*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.33** -0.24** -0.23** -0.2* -0.21** -0.2*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.01) (0.006) (0.01)
0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Control variables
0.16*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank size (A) 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage (A/w) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.897) (0.919) (0.927) (0.896)
0.0* 0.0**
(0.013) (0.008)
0.02*** 0.0 0.0
(0.000) (0.759) (0.434)
0.01
(0.114)
Time FE (not shown)
Time x Cooperative bank dummy 
FE (not shown)
Bank FE (not shown)
Observations 62560 62560 62560 61330 61430 61430
Number of groups 1632 1632 1632 1617 1617 1617
Error Standard Deviation 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Fixed-effect variance 0.07 0.05 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
Goodness of Fit (adj.) 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
F-Statistic (all coeff=0) 32.24 33.16 36.24 38.6 35.29 37.43
                                              Legend: coefficient/(p-value); * p < 0.05,** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Change of G&Y indicator (ΔΨ)
Liquidity need (θ) x                    
Credit cooperative dummy
Change of G&Y indicator (ΔΨ) x    
Credit cooperative dummy
Change of other assets (ΔAo)
Change of other liabilities (ΔLo)
Change of intragroup lending 
(ΔG)
Centrality in interbank market 
(Ce)
Change of creditor/debtor ratio 
(ΔR)
Table 4: Main model for gross short-term liabilities and credit cooperatives
The regression table shows coefficients and p-values for several diff-in-diff models estimated for all savings
banks and credit cooperatives. They regress gross short-term liabilities to other banks on two independent
variables and some bank-level control variables. Models include interaction effects for credit cooperatives
and the explanatory variables in order to analyse whether credit cooperatives show different effects to
savings banks. Where appropriate, variables are log-differences and a robust non-parametric estimator
is used to calculate standard errors. Liquidity need is the difference of interperiod changes in loans and
interperiod changes in deposits. The G&Y indicator gives an indication of the importance of a bank to
the financial system. Control variables account for bank size and leverage, its position in the interbank
market, and changes to the balance sheet that would mechanically change liabilities to other banks. All
models control for bank fixed effects, time fixed effects, and time-dummy interaction effects from the diff-
in-diff model. Data sources: Monatliche Bilanzstatistik and Millionenevidenzdaten (both from Deutsche
Bundesbank).
borrowing, the additional effect for credit cooperatives is still strongly significant and
positive.
In summary, the evidence provided by the German interbank market is consistent
with hypothesis H2. For private banks, a distinct positive effect exists between an
increase in liabilities to other banks and an increase in the bailout probability proxy
beyond the effect expected by a peer group. The effect is present for credit cooperatives in
direct comparison with savings banks, a stronger effect is present for private commercial
banks when using savings banks and credit cooperatives as a baseline, and it is preserved
at different maturities and when estimating interbank borrowing in gross terms.
4.2 Liquidity management secondary driver for private commercial
banks
Throughout all models, a highly significant and positive correlation can be found be-
tween net interbank borrowing and the liquidity needs of banks. This is consistent with
hypothesis H1a and with the standard assumption of economic literature. The effect
is strongest when considering total net interbank borrowing (cf. Tables 3 and 5) but
also present in models for net short-term borrowing (cf. Table 12) and gross short-
term borrowing (cf. table 4). For the more regionally-focused savings banks and credit
cooperatives no significant differences between the two banking groups can be found
consistently. Only for short-term gross borrowing is the effect slightly smaller for credit
cooperatives than for savings banks. The role of banks to channel funds to profitable
investment opportunities manifests itself in the same way as liquidity co-insurance does.
Banks may borrow in the interbank market in order to take advantage of profitable
lending opportunities which leads to intermediation chains.
However, consistent with hypothesis H1b, the correlation between net interbank
borrowing and liquidity needs is much smaller for private commercial banks (cf. Table
5). In fact, ignoring any control variables model (1) of Table 13 shows no significant
positive correlation at all. While not statistically significant, the effect for liquidity
management is also muted for credit cooperatives (cf. Table 3). Thus, while a strong
correlation between the indicator for strategic behaviour is present in the data, for
private commercial banks the changes in interbank liabilities are much less determined
by liquidity needs.
4.3 Stability throughout financial crisis and effects of controls
Table 6 shows models examining the effect of the financial crisis on the explanatory
variables. The dummy variable included for post-crisis is for all time periods after
October 2008. The models include both a dummy for post-crisis as well as interaction
effects with the explanatory variables. While there is a very small positive effect on net
interbank borrowing in post-crisis periods, no significant effects on either the liquidity
provision effect or the G&Y indicator are found. The absence of any such effects suggests
that the identified effects are stable.
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Coefficients of diff-in-diff model of change in net liabilities to other banks (Φ)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Independent variables
Liquidity need (θ) 4.6*** 5.21*** 5.18*** 5.33*** 5.32*** 5.32*** 5.34***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.67*** 0.49*** 0.5*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.43***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-4.47*** -4.99*** -4.96*** -5.13*** -5.11*** -5.11*** -5.13***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00) (0.000) (0.000)
0.25** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.36** 0.38** 0.38** 0.39**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Control variables
0.8*** 0.8*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 1.02***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.5*** -0.49*** -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.58*** -0.55***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank size (A) -0.04** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.04**
(0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Leverage (A/w) -0.11*** -0.1*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.12***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.26
(0.133)
0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.152) (0.148) (0.17)
-0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04
(0.63) (0.105) (0.301) (0.191)
-0.01 -0.01
(0.406) (0.436)
Time FE (not shown)
Time x Cooperative bank dummy 
FE (not shown)
Bank FE (not shown)
Observations 67451 67449 67449 64612 64885 64885 64885
Number of groups 1885 1885 1885 1749 1753 1753 1753
Error Standard Deviation 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
Fixed-effect variance 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
Goodness of Fit (adj.) 0.26 0.3 0.3 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27
F-Statistic (all coeff=0) 53.0 55.56 56.12 54.25 56.24 55.17 53.76
                                                          Legend: coefficient/(p-value); * p < 0.05,** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Change of G&Y indicator (ΔΨ)
Liquidity need (θ) x                    
Private commercial bank dummy
Change of G&Y indicator (ΔΨ) x    
Private commercial bank dummy
Change of other assets (ΔAo)
Change of other liabilities (ΔLo)
Change of equity (Δw)
Change of intragroup lending 
(ΔG)
Centrality in interbank market 
(Ce)
Change of creditor/debtor ratio 
(ΔR)
Table 5: Main model for effect of private commercial banks
The regression table shows coefficients and p-values for several diff-in-diff models estimated for all univer-
sal credit banks in Germany. They regress net liabilities to other banks on two independent variables and
some bank-level control variables. The models include interaction effects for private commercial banks
and the explanatory variables in order to analyse whether private commercial banks show different effects
to other universal banks. Where appropriate, variables are log-differences and a robust non-parametric
estimator is used to calculate standard errors. Change in net liabilities to other banks is interperiod
change of net interbank borrowing. Liquidity need is the difference of interperiod changes in loans and
interperiod changes in deposits. The G&Y indicator gives an indication of the importance of a bank to
the financial system. Control variables account for bank size and leverage, its position in the interbank
market, and changes to the balance sheet that would mechanically change net liabilities to other banks.
All models control for bank fixed effects, time fixed effects, and time-dummy interaction effects from
the diff-in-diff model. Data sources: Monatliche Bilanzstatistik and Millionenevidenzdaten (both from
Deutsche Bundesbank).
Coefficients of diff-in-diff model of change in net liabilities to other banks (Φ)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent variables
Liquidity need (θ) 0.5** 0.58*** 0.57*** 0.81**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
0.86*** 0.8*** 0.81*** 0.8***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Post-crisis dummy              
(omitted)
0.15*** 0.14*** 0.04* 0.07***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000)
-0.24 -0.19 -0.18 -0.42
(0.077) (0.219) (0.227) (0.065)
0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.08
(0.547) (0.733) (0.731) (0.359)
Control variables
0.67*** 0.67*** 0.82***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.39*** -0.38*** -0.44***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank size (A) -0.05** -0.07***
(0.002) (0.000)
Leverage (A/w) -0.15*** -0.15***
(0.000) (0.000)
0.02
(0.438)
Time FE (not shown)
Time x Cooperative bank dummy 
FE (not shown)
Bank FE (not shown)
Observations 67451 67449 67449 64885
Number of groups 1885 1885 1885 1753
Error Standard Deviation 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.5
Fixed-effect variance 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.09
Goodness of Fit (adj.) 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.2
F-Statistic (all coeff=0) 62.99 68.62 68.03 66.8
                                      Legend: coefficient/(p-value); * p < 0.05,** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Centrality in interbank market 
(Ce)
Change of G&Y indicator (ΔΨ)
Liquidity need (θ) x                    
Post-crisis dummy
Change of G&Y indicator (ΔΨ) x   
Post-crisis dummy
Change of other assets (ΔAo)
Change of other liabilities (ΔLo)
Table 6: Effect of financial crisis on interbank market activity
The regression table shows coefficients and p-values for several diff-in-diff models estimated for all uni-
versal credit banks in Germany. They regress net liabilities to other banks on two independent variables
and some bank-level control variables. The models include a dummy variable for post-financial crisis
periods (post Q3 2008) and interaction effects of the dummy and the explanatory variables to analyse
whether the financial crisis had an effect on interbank market behaviour. Where appropriate, variables
are log-differences and a robust non-parametric estimator is used to calculate standard errors. Change
in net liabilities to other banks is interperiod change of net interbank borrowing. Liquidity need is the
difference of interperiod changes in loans and interperiod changes in deposits. The G&Y indicator gives
an indication of the importance of a bank to the financial system. Control variables account for bank size
and leverage, its position in the interbank market, and changes to the balance sheet that would mechani-
cally change net liabilities to other banks. All models control for bank fixed effects, time fixed effects, and
time-dummy interaction effects from the diff-in-diff model. Data sources: Monatliche Bilanzstatistik and
Millionenevidenzdaten (both from Deutsche Bundesbank).
The analysis focuses on explaining the dynamic behaviour of banks in the interbank
market. Throughout the regression models the adjusted goodness of fit is less than
0.3. A low goodness of fit is not surprising, given much of the lending and borrowing
decisions arise out of the bilateral relationship between banks and depend on individual
bank characteristics such as riskiness, credit rating, prior lending history, or the position
in the interbank market, which cannot be included in this study. The regression models
control for these effects through bank fixed effects (as well as time fixed effects), which
are not shown in the output.
The regression models control for a range of variables that are expected to mechani-
cally influence the size of net interbank liabilities as well as for bank-specific characteris-
tics such as leverage and the position of a bank in the interbank market, which similarly
can be expected to have an effect on the size of changes in net liabilities to other banks.
Due to the balance sheet identity, one would expect an increase of assets or a decrease in
non-interbank liabilities to lead to an increase in net liabilities to the interbank market.
All models therefore control for changes in bank size by including effects for changes in
other assets, other liabilities, and equity. When those coefficients are statistically sig-
nificant, one obtains coefficients of expected directionality. When other assets increase,
net interbank borrowing increases, while when other liabilities increase, net interbank
borrowing decreases. Changes in equity are negatively correlated with changes in net
interbank liabilities.
In order to account for the tiering of the German interbank market as identified by
Craig and von Peter (2014), who show that large banks occupy core positions in the
interbank market, all models also control for the absolute size of banks, as well as their
leverage. Models four to seven always control for positional factors as well as changes in
interbank exposures potentially attributable to a change in the composition of borrowers
and lenders ∆R, and changes in the complexity of bank operations (as proxied by ∆G
i.e. the lending among independent entities of the same bank). Generally, the centrality
of a bank in the interbank market Cei does not have a statistically significant effect on the
dynamic evolution of liabilities over time for any bank type. There is a small negative
effect for short-term interbank borrowing. Changes in the balance of creditor to debtors
(∆Ri) are not statistically significant. The level of intragroup lending (Gi) and leverage
(Ai/wi) are further indicators for the size and complexity of the operations of a bank
and thus included as controls.
5 Discussion
This is the first study that empirically examines the factors contributing to the emergence
of interbank markets. Isolating an additional driver for private banks to be active in
the interbank market is the main contribution of our work. In addition to managing
liquidity needs, the interbank market activities of private banks influence their bailout
probability. The study identifies a strong relationship between an increase in liabilities
to other banks and an increase in the G&Y indicator, which is used as a proxy for
the bailout probability of a bank, attributable purely to the governance structure of
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private banks. The study further shows that the liquidity management function of the
interbank market is less important for private commercial banks than it is for more
regionally-oriented banks. While models considering idiosyncratic liquidity shocks as
the rationale for interbank lending may adequately represent a subclass of banks, at
least for some types of banks further incentives need to be considered. The finding is in
line with differences in the business models of different bank types active in the German
interbank market. We discuss the limitations of the study before addressing implications
for economic theory and policy makers.
The study has at least three limitations. Firstly, we could not test whether the G&Y
indicator is a proxy for the probability that an insolvent entity would receive guarantees
or any form of tangible economic advantage. Follow-up work should address whether
the G&Y indicator and other structural measures of importance to the financial sys-
tem influence the return on assets by banks. Credit rating agencies offer two types of
credit ratings, standalone credit ratings as well as ’all-in’ credit ratings including sup-
port ratings (?). Standalone ratings consider only the financial strength of an institution.
Support ratings offer a view on the likelihood that in case of need liabilities will be guar-
anteed. Such support is likely to stem from governments. Thus, support ratings could
be used as an additional measure of systemic importance. In addition, the difference in
credit ratings between standalone and support ratings could be taken as a measure of
economic benefit from higher bailout probabilities.
It seems plausible that the systemic importance of banks has a bearing on the bailout
probability, or at least the perceived bailout probability. This effect in return ought to
reduce borrowing costs of banks which would constitute a sufficient driver of interbank
borrowing. Several studies have examined a natural experiment in Germany, in which
explicit government guarantees for Landesbanken were abolished (cf. Fischer et al., 2014,
Gropp, Gruendl and Guettler, 2014, and Ko¨rner and Schnabel, 2013). Landesbanken
are large credit-centre banks for savings banks. The studies conclusively establish a
loss of economic value due to the removal of explicit guarantees that manifests itself in
increased bond spreads, higher funding costs, lower credit ratings, and a loss of charter
value. At the same time the studies show that a removal of guarantees induced higher
risk-taking, which is in line with our findings. Acharya, Anginer and Warburton (2015)
provide further evidence for the effect of implicit government guarantees on borrowing
costs. They find that for the largest financial institutions in the US credit spreads are
not sensitive to idiosyncratic risk measures.
Future work further needs to examine how governments decide on whether to bail out
banks. Regulators generally face a trade-off between assuring depositors of the safety
of their deposits, and thus avoid bank runs, and ensuring that banks do not engage
in excessive risk taking (Shapiro and Skeie, 2015). Bank runs as well as excessive risk
taking pose a source of systemic risk. It seems plausible that bail out decisions are driven
by two factors and motivated by ensuring a functioning banking system. If the overall
stability of the financial system is large or the failure of a bailout candidate is likely to
not cause contagious effects, regulators are more likely to not bail out banks but rather
increase deposit guarantees. Similarly, if uncertainty is high and the banking system
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under pressure, for instance due to asset depreciations, bail outs may be more likely.
Secondly, while the dataset offers detailed information on the balance sheets of banks
and bilateral exposures, the granularity of this information is limited both in the sense
that it does not include any information about individual loans, but also in that it only
shows quarterly data. In any study of this type, some uncertainty regarding the liquid-
ity needs, the level of interbank lending, and the level of interbank borrowing remain.
Bluhm, Georg and Krahnen (2016) further explore questions of interbank intermediation
in the German interbank market through a dynamic model. While the dataset allows
one to differentiate between loans of different maturities, no daily information on either
bilateral exposures nor balance sheets exists. Of course markets exist to balance out
shortfall and excess liquidity in federal fund reservers in order to meet minimum re-
serve requirements. Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2011) study this market and show that
bank characteristics become more important in times of financial distress and that long-
standing lending and borrowing relationships help to limit borrowing costs. The results
of this study thus cannot be taken to preclude that at short maturities private com-
mercial banks are highly active in interbank markets to balance liquidity fluctuations.
However, the muted liquidity management effect documented for private commercial
banks and the heightened effect for a bailout probability indicator allow one to conclude
that liquidity management, while an important driver of interbank markets, is not the
only reason why banks enter interbank exposures.
Moreover, alternative sources for satisfying liquidity needs exist, especially for private
commercial banks. These include bond markets, repo transactions, and raising further
capital. While the study controls for changes in capital, credit markets and repo trans-
actions are not included. For future research into the liquidity management of private
commercial banks these sources of funds ought to be included.
Thirdly, the study only analyses the interbank market of one country. Therefore, it is
impossible to estimate a function for the probability of bailout or market sentiments and
take account of the fact that the importance and composition of interbank markets differ
between countries. For instance, assume that the probability of government support of
failing financial institutions was significantly lower in the US than in Germany, but the
importance of banks to the financial system be evaluated in the same manner. It seems
reasonable to assume a cost associated with increasing interbank exposures depending
on bank characteristics such as size. For some banks, it would never be optimal to
target a high G&Y indicator because irrespective of the structure of their balance sheet,
deposits would not be guaranteed. It also seems reasonable to assume that there is
some uncertainty or ambiguity regarding the threshold at which a bank would receive
government support.
With this framework in mind, one could account at least for some stylised facts as
can be seen in the distributions of G&Y βis between Germany and the US in 2012 (cf.
Figure 6). It is clear from the plot that while a significant dispersion of βis exists within
countries, the distributions are fundamentally different between countries. If managing
interbank exposures is associated with a cost, increasing them to a level sufficient for the
market sentiment to tip towards expecting guarantees may be suboptimal. A dispersed
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Figure 6: Intercountry comparison of Glasserman & Young βs 2012
The figure shows an intercountry comparison of the distribution of G&Y βs in 2012
by showing box plots for publicly traded banks in five different countries. Outliers
of more than 1.5 interquartile ranges above Q3 or below Q1 are plotted separately.
It considers only banks that are headquartered in the respective country in order to
avoid data artefacts related to cross-country lending between subsidiaries and their
parent bank. Source: created by author, data from Bankscope (2013).
distribution of βis is always to be expected, given differences in the business models of
financial institutions. In order to understand the role of different jurisdictions, compar-
ative studies between countries are necessary. The model in Krause and Reed-Tsochas
(2016) uses a bailout function for which two parameters can be estimated that charac-
terise intercountry or temporal differences in the uncertainty that a bank with a given
G&Y indicator would receive financial guarantees or a bailout as well as the threshold
at which such aid would be granted. However, given the confidential nature of the data,
as well as a limited number of countries with suitable data availability, this stream of
research could prove difficult.
The paper has some theoretical implications. First and foremost, banks show very
different behaviour depending on their business model. So, in any banking models such
structural and environmental characteristics need to be considered. Moreover, interbank
markets do not serve a uniform purpose. One can distinguish between the liquidity
management function, which is present for all banks but more pronounced for smaller
banks with a regional focus, but moreover scholars need to explain a strategic function
decoupled from the liquidity function. Others have argued that banks coordinate their
behaviour in making investment decisions in order to fail together and benefit from
ensuing government support (cf. Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Eisert and Eufinger,
2013; Farhi and Tirole, 2012) and even that banks can shift systemic risk to governments
by such coordinated behaviour (Acharya, 2009). In addition to becoming more connected
through interbank lending, investing in the same assets causes indirect linkages between
31
financial institutions that can act to further induce government subsidies. However, there
is no evidence for banks colluding in order to extract a government subsidy, even though
evidence exists of higher risk taking following government bailouts (Duchin and Sosyura,
2014). Instead, if market sentiments matter for the return expectations of investors and
depositors, competitive banks have an individual incentive to increase their perceived
importance to the financial system (lower borrowing cost). It is a well documented effect
in sociology that status in markets matters for pricing structures of firms (cf. Podolny,
1993). Moreover, Podolny (2005) shows that status can be modelled through network
centrality measures. Firms with higher status obtain a premium due to the signalling
effect of status as conveying higher quality of intangible services. Market sentiments
regarding the probability of default can play a similar role with regards to expected
absolute returns. As the market sentiment is less important for savings banks due to
having a deposit insurance scheme and public ownership, this line of reasoning offers an
explanation for the observed findings.
The study also illustrates a dilemma for policy makers. Banks differ by their business
model and thus regulation should be tailored specifically to structural and behavioural
differences arising from that. While it is a trivial point that government behaviour
will influence strategic decisions by banks, it is somewhat more subtle to think about
the structural consequences this behaviour can have. The identification of strategic
behaviour of universal banks and an additional driver of interbank markets provide a
coherent explanation for why taxpayer-funded bank-bailouts create adverse incentives.
For instance, establishing a formal mechanism in Europe to deal with bank defaults in
order to avoid financial contagion in the case of collapse of an institution may exacerbate
the underlying problem as opposed to solving it. It is commonly agreed that large
financial institutions should not fail because of concerns that in a highly connected
financial system such failures could lead to contagion (cf. Bhattacharya and Nyborg,
2013, Freixas et al., 2000, Freixas and Rochet, 2008, 2013, Gai, Haldane and Kapadia,
2011). Financial institutions act in a competitive environment. If market participants
form expectations regarding the likelihood of bank bailouts based on some observable
signal of a bank, either based on a structural measure or on a balance-sheet-based one,
then any policy that lowers the bar for bank bailouts will lead to a more tight-knit
financial system. As long as costs of increasing interbank liabilities are sufficiently low,
higher interbank connections are beneficial to financial institutions. So, rather than
discouraging a close-knit interbank market in the first place such policies may lead to
an increase in interconnectivity.
Precisely this conundrum has been addressed in the ‘Vickers report’, which has had
decisive influence in the reform of the UK banking sector (cf. HM Treasury, 2012).
By ring fencing bank operations central to the real economy and allowing other parts
of banks to fail in case of financial difficulty, some uncertainty regarding bailouts is
removed. Krause and Reed-Tsochas (2016) show that in the absence of liquidity shocks,
an uncertain positive probability of bailout needs to exist in order for an interbank
market to emerge. As a consequence, if ring fencing can be enforced credibly, this
reduces the likelihood of inflated interbank lending and thus reduces systemic risk in a
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banking system.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that the traditional assumption of interbank markets as a mechanism to
balance out liquidity needs is incomplete and that additional drivers need to be taken
seriously. While the empirical findings support the liquidity management function of
interbank markets, for private banks the data supports a theory of interbank markets in
which the liabilities to other banks influence the probability of being bailed out under
financial distress. Moreover, for private commercial banks in Germany the relationship
between liquidity needs and interbank market activities is much weaker than for its
smaller and regionally-focused counterparts (savings banks and credit cooperatives).
Thus, the results of the study indicate that the purpose of interbank market activity
varies substantially for different types of banks and that banks with uninsured liabilities
act strategically in the interbank market. This insight not only has implications for
economic theory in that models of interbank lending need to account for bank type,
but also that additional incentives for banks engaging in interbank lending need to
be accounted for in theoretical models. The study thus supports a growing literature
exploring alternatives to liquidity co-insurance as drivers of interbank markets.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix A: Descriptive statistics of the German banking sector
and interbank market
Table 7 contains some key variables describing the German banking sector as well as
the interbank market and shows their evolution between 2002 and 2012. It shows the
size of the banking sector, total interbank liabilities, total equity, the number of banks,
as well as total intragroup exposure and interbank exposure. The intragroup exposures
are all on and off-balance sheet exposures between entities with the same parent bank.
Total intragroup exposure is simply the sum of all credit and derivatives exposure (on
and off-balance sheet exposures) of all entities with a banking license in Germany. In
addition, the table contains some descriptive network variables. Each bank in the market
is considered a node and each bilateral exposure is considered a weighted directed edge,
where the weight is equivalent to total exposure. Three network measures are reported.19
1. Diameter (SCC): the diameter of the smallest connected component (SCC) is the
longest shortest path between any two nodes in a network that are connected by
a path. Say A, B, and C are banks. If A has an exposure to B and B has an
exposure to C, then A and C are connected through a path of length two.
2. Average undirected clustering:20 The network is reduced to an unweighted and
undirected network. I.e. links between nodes are binary. If an exposure of one
bank to another exists, the two are said to be linked or being connected by an
edge. Clustering can be measured in different ways (cf. Newman, 2010). In this
paper we measure the extent to which two nodes that share a common link to
a third node are also linked, often referred to as transitivity. Such a (potential)
triangular relationship is called triplet. Clustering measures the ratio of existing
triplets to potential triplets. We can define ci as the clustering coefficient of a
node in a network. In an undirected graph it is the number of triplets (Ti) passing
through that node to the possible number of triplets passing through that node.
Letting n be the number of nodes in a network, N the set of those nodes, and di
the number of neighbours of node i (or the edges of node i), then clustering is
ci =
2Ti
di(di − 1) (10)
and thus the average undirected clustering
C =
1
n
∑
i∈N
ci. (11)
19cf. Newman (2010) or Jackson (2008)
20Calculated using NetworkX library (Python), cf. https://networkx.github.io/documentation/
latest/reference/generated/networkx.algorithms.cluster.average clustering.html#networkx.algorithms.
cluster.average clustering [Accessed: 13 September 2015].
34
3. Density: This is simply the ratio of the existing number of links in a network to
possible links in a network. So, a low density means that a network is sparse and
only very few of the possible links exist. Using the same nomenclature as above
we can write density for a directed network as
D =
∑N
i=1 di
n(n− 1) . (12)
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7.2 Appendix B: Description of key variables and correlation matrices
Table 8 shows descriptive statistics for some of the original variables in the dataset at
different points in time. It shows that all variables are asymmetrically distributed. This
is reflective of a tiered banking system with some very large banks and many small
institutions. For the regression analyses variables are largely log-transformed.
Table 9 shows the correlation coefficients between the variables used for the regression
analyses presented in Table 3. Table 10 shows the correlation coefficients between the
variables used for the regression analyses presented in Table 4. As a consequence of the
transfomations the correlations between variables are mostly low, so that they cannot
be expected to distort regression results.
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7.3 Appendix C: Robustness checks of analysis
This appendix contains three robustness checks of the results obtained in the main
section.
The first robustness check is shown in Table 11. It presents results of an estimation
of the main model but with the diff-in-diff estimator for savings banks rather than for
credit cooperatives.
The second check shown in Table 12 estimates a similar model to that in the main
analysis, but for short-term liabilities to other banks.
Lastly, Table 13 shows a robustness check of the second main model estimating the
effect of private commercial banks. The robustness check includes a diff-in-diff estimator
for non-commercial banks but otherwise estimates the same model.
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Coefficients of diff-in-diff model of change in net liabilities to other banks (Φ)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Independent variables
Liquidity need (θ) 4.43*** 5.88*** 5.84*** 5.87*** 5.87*** 5.87*** 5.94***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.76*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.27***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.74 0.21 0.23 0.45 0.21 0.45 0.74
(0.217) (0.745) (0.729) (0.453) (0.75) (0.453) (0.211)
-0.42*** -0.49*** -0.48*** -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.49***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Control variables
1.88*** 1.89*** 1.9*** 1.9*** 1.9*** 2.17***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.83*** -0.82*** -0.82*** -0.83*** -0.82*** -0.7***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank size (A) -0.1*** -0.1*** -0.1*** -0.1*** -0.04***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage (A/w) -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.14***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
-1.35***
(0.000)
0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.04 0.0 -0.01 -0.01
(0.118) (0.833) (0.542) (0.662)
-0.03 -0.02
(0.108) (0.326)
Time FE (not shown)
Time x Savings bank dummy FE 
(not shown)
Bank FE (not shown)
Observations 62590 62590 62590 61360 61460 61460 61460
Number of groups 1632 1632 1632 1617 1617 1617 1617
Error Standard Deviation 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.45
Fixed-effect variance 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04
Goodness of Fit (adj.) 0.17 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29
F-Statistic (all coeff=0) 53.14 52.93 52.25 50.01 51.05 49.9 48.6
                                                          Legend: coefficient/(p-value); * p < 0.05,** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Change of equity (Δw)
Change of intragroup lending 
(ΔG)
Centrality in interbank market 
(Ce)
Change of creditor/debtor ratio 
(ΔR)
Change of G&Y indicator (ΔΨ)
Liquidity need (θ) x                    
Savings bank dummy
Change of G&Y indicator (ΔΨ) x    
Savings bank dummy
Change of other assets (ΔAo)
Change of other liabilities (ΔLo)
Table 11: Control model for effect of savings banks
The regression table shows coefficients and p-values for several diff-in-diff models estimated for all savings
banks and credit cooperatives. They regress net liabilities to other banks on two independent variables
and some bank-level control variables. The models include interaction effects for savings banks and the
explanatory variables in order to analyse whether savings banks show different effects to credit coopera-
tives. Where appropriate, variables are log-differences and a robust non-parametric estimator is used to
calculate standard errors. Change in net liabilities to other banks is interperiod change of net interbank
borrowing. Liquidity need is the difference of interperiod changes in loans and interperiod changes in
deposits. The G&Y indicator gives an indication of the importance of a bank to the financial system.
Control variables account for bank size and leverage, its position in the interbank market, and changes
to the balance sheet that would mechanically change net liabilities to other banks. All models control for
bank fixed effects, time fixed effects, and time-dummy interaction effects from the diff-in-diff model. Data
sources: Monatliche Bilanzstatistik and Millionenevidenzdaten (both from Deutsche Bundesbank).
Coefficients of diff-in-diff model of change in net short-term liabilities to other banks (ΦST)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Independent variables
Liquidity need (θ) 0.41 0.55* 0.54* 0.6* 0.52* 0.6* 0.72**
(0.099) (0.026) (0.029) (0.01) (0.036) (0.01) (0.002)
0.0 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.1
(0.967) (0.164) (0.191) (0.231) (0.215) (0.207) (0.051)
0.29 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.39 0.31 0.21
(0.273) (0.166) (0.172) (0.218) (0.144) (0.222) (0.398)
0.26*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.26***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Control variables
0.27*** 0.27*** 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.39***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.08**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007)
Bank size (A) -0.03* -0.03 -0.03* -0.03* -0.01
(0.042) (0.053) (0.033) (0.036) (0.339)
Leverage (A/w) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04
(0.47) (0.54) (0.577) (0.588) (0.118)
-0.42***
(0.000)
0.0** 0.0** 0.0**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
-0.11*** -0.08*** -0.08** -0.08**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
0.0 0.01
(0.881) (0.691)
Time FE (not shown)
Time x Cooperative bank dummy 
FE (not shown)
Bank FE (not shown)
Observations 54706 54706 54706 53778 53858 53858 53858
Number of groups 1616 1616 1616 1600 1600 1600 1600
Error Standard Deviation 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Fixed-effect variance 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Goodness of Fit (adj.) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
F-Statistic (all coeff=0) 11.24 11.4 11.36 11.09 11.22 11.11 11.49
                                                          Legend: coefficient/(p-value); * p < 0.05,** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Change of equity (Δw)
Change of intragroup lending 
(ΔG)
Centrality in interbank market 
(Ce)
Change of creditor/debtor ratio 
(ΔR)
Change of G&Y indicator (ΔΨ)
Liquidity need (θ) x                    
Credit cooperative dummy
Change of G&Y indicator (ΔΨ) x    
Credit cooperative dummy
Change of other assets (ΔAo)
Change of other liabilities (ΔLo)
Table 12: Control model for short-term interbank liabilities and credit cooperatives
The regression table shows coefficients and p-values for several diff-in-diff models estimated for all savings
banks and credit cooperatives. They regress net short-term liabilities to other banks on two independent
variables and some bank-level control variables. The models include interaction effects for credit co-
operatives and the explanatory variables in order to analyse whether credit cooperatives show different
effects to savings banks. Where appropriate, variables are log-differences and a robust non-parametric
estimator is used to calculate standard errors. Change in net liabilities to other banks is interperiod
change of net interbank borrowing. Liquidity need is the difference of interperiod changes in loans and
interperiod changes in deposits. The G&Y indicator gives an indication of the importance of a bank to
the financial system. Control variables account for bank size and leverage, its position in the interbank
market, and changes to the balance sheet that would mechanically change net liabilities to other banks.
All models control for bank fixed effects, time fixed effects, and time-dummy interaction effects from
the diff-in-diff model. Data sources: Monatliche Bilanzstatistik and Millionenevidenzdaten (both from
Deutsche Bundesbank).
Coefficients of diff-in-diff model of change in net liabilities to other banks (Φ)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Independent variables
Liquidity need (θ) 0.13 0.22** 0.22** 0.2* 0.2* 0.2* 0.21*
(0.076) (0.006) (0.007) (0.044) (0.045) (0.043) (0.037)
0.91*** 0.87*** 0.88*** 0.81*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.82***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4.47*** 4.99*** 4.96*** 5.13*** 5.11*** 5.11*** 5.13***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.25** -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.36** -0.38** -0.38** -0.39**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Control variables
0.8*** 0.8*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 1.02***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.5*** -0.49*** -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.58*** -0.55***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank size (A) -0.04** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.04**
(0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Leverage (A/w) -0.11*** -0.1*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.12***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.26
(0.133)
0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.152) (0.148) (0.17)
-0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04
(0.63) (0.105) (0.301) (0.191)
-0.01 -0.01
(0.406) (0.436)
Time FE (not shown)
Time x Cooperative bank dummy 
FE (not shown)
Bank FE (not shown)
Observations 67451 67449 67449 64612 64885 64885 64885
Number of groups 1885 1885 1885 1749 1753 1753 1753
Error Standard Deviation 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
Fixed-effect variance 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
Goodness of Fit (adj.) 0.26 0.3 0.3 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27
F-Statistic (all coeff=0) 53.0 55.56 56.12 54.25 56.24 55.17 53.76
                                                          Legend: coefficient/(p-value); * p < 0.05,** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Change of G&Y indicator (ΔΨ)
Liquidity need (θ) x                    
Non-commercial bank dummy
Change of G&Y indicator (ΔΨ) x    
Non-commercial bank dummy
Change of other assets (ΔAo)
Change of other liabilities (ΔLo)
Change of equity (Δw)
Change of intragroup lending 
(ΔG)
Centrality in interbank market 
(Ce)
Change of creditor/debtor ratio 
(ΔR)
Table 13: Control model for effect of non-commercial banks
The regression table shows coefficients and p-values for several diff-in-diff models estimated for all uni-
versal credit banks in Germany. They regress net liabilities to other banks on two independent variables
and some bank-level control variables. The models include interaction effects for non-commercial banks
and the explanatory variables in order to analyse whether non-commercial banks show different effects
to other universal banks. Where appropriate, variables are log-differences and a robust non-parametric
estimator is used to calculate standard errors. Change in net liabilities to other banks is interperiod
change of net interbank borrowing. Liquidity need is the difference of interperiod changes in loans and
interperiod changes in deposits. The G&Y indicator gives an indication of the importance of a bank to
the financial system. Control variables account for bank size and leverage, its position in the interbank
market, and changes to the balance sheet that would mechanically change net liabilities to other banks.
All models control for bank fixed effects, time fixed effects, and time-dummy interaction effects from
the diff-in-diff model. Data sources: Monatliche Bilanzstatistik and Millionenevidenzdaten (both from
Deutsche Bundesbank).
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